

ATHENS AND EGESTA

I

THIS paper is principally concerned with two fifth century Athenian inscriptions and their interpretation. The first, *IG* i² 19, was discovered on the Akropolis and first published by Ulrich Köhler in 1867.¹ Some twenty years later it was re-examined by H. G. Lolling,² who was the first to see that it concerned relations between Athens and Eggesta. It has subsequently been the object of the usual ingenious attempts at restoration. I give below a conservative text.

Date uncertain

ΣΤΟΙΧ 48 (except line 1)

[χουμμαχία καὶ ἡόρκ]ο[ς Ἀθηναίων καὶ] Ἐγισταί[ον]³
 [ἔδοχσεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τ]ῶ[ι δέμοι . . .⁶ . . . ἰς] ἔ[π]ρυτάνευε, [. . . .]
 [.¹⁹]ο[.¹⁶]ον ἔρχε, Ἀρ[. . .]δ[. . .]⁴
 [.³⁹]ταὐτὸ ¹⁵ [.]
 5 [.¹⁹]ιο[.¹⁸]α[.⁸]
 [.³⁷]ιτο[. . .]δ[.⁶]
 [.¹⁹]ερ[.]ο[.]π[. . .]ἰεβὰ ἡόσομ[περ . . .]
 [.¹⁸ τ]ὸν ἡό[ρκ]ο[ν] ὀμνύ[γα]ι· ἡόπ[ος] δ' ἂν ὀμό[σοσ]
 [ἰν ἡάπαντες ἡοι στρατ]εγοὶ ἐπιμελεθέν[τον παρ]αγγ[ελ] . . .⁵ . . .]
 10 [.¹⁴ μετὰ τ]ῶν ἡο[ρ]κοτῶν ἡόπ[ος]]ς Ἐγ[εσταί]ο.
 [.¹¹ τὸ δὲ φσέ]φισμα τόδε καὶ τὸν [ἡόρκ]ο[ν] ἀνα[γράφ]α
 [ἰ ἐστέλει λιθίνοι ἐμ π]όλοι τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βολῆς· [ἡοι δὲ π]
 [ολεται ἀπομισθοσάντ]ον· ἡο[ι] δὲ κολακρέται δό[ν]το[ν] τὸ ἀργύρ
 [ιον· καλέσαι δὲ καὶ ἐπ]ὶ χσένια τὲν πρεσβείαν τῶν Ἐ[γισταίων]
 15 [ἔς πρυτανεῖον ἐς τὸν] νομιζόμενον χρόνον· ἡ Εὔφε[μος εἶπε· τὰ]
 [μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῆι β]ολῆι· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐπειδὰν π[ρέσβες ἔλ]
 [θοσιν ἀπ' Ἐγισταίων⁶ ἡο κ]έρυχς προσαγ[έτο]¹⁵]
 [.²² τὸ]ς π[ρέσβες] — — οἱ π[ρυτάνευ]

lacuna

After the heading in line 1 there followed the usual prescript. We can see from the number of letters that the prytanising tribe in line 2 must have been either Ἐρεχθεῖς, Κεκροπίς or

¹ *Hermes* ii (1867) 16–18. Köhler was unable to read the first line and suspected that the decree concerned the Hestiaians.

² *ADelt* (1891) 105–8, fig. A9, cf. *IG* I sp 139.

³ A. G. Woodhead, *Hesperia* xvii (1948) 58–9 suggested that the spacing of the letters definitely preserved in line 1 [– – –] Ἐγισταί[–] allowed room at the beginning of the line for the restoration [φιλία καὶ χουμμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ]. However, Köhler, *op. cit.* (note 1) and Lolling, *op. cit.* (note 2) had noted traces of a round letter above and slightly to the right of]ο[in line 2. Professors M. F. McGregor and D. Bradeen have confirmed the presence of the round letter and my own suggestion is a conservative version of their new reading proposed in *Phoenix* xxiv (1970) 179: [χουμμαχία καὶ ἡόρ]κο[ς] Ἀ[θ]ε[ν]αίων καὶ Ἐγισταί[ον].

⁴ Of the penultimate letter in line 3 only the left sloping hasta of a delta or alpha seems to be legible, cf. Lolling's fig. A9, *op. cit.* (note 2). I have read]δ[in view of the restoration proposed below, Ἀρ[χ]ε]δ[ε]μ[ος]. As for the last letter in line 3 I have been unable to trace the source of Hiller's reading of a clear epsilon (*IG* i² 19.3). There would seem to be no trace of the letter on the stone.

⁵ Traces of a verticle hasta are all that remain of this letter, cf. Lolling's fig. A9, *op. cit.* (note 2).

⁶ In lines 11–16 the restorations suggested by Lolling, *op. cit.* (note 2) 105 would appear to be certain and for the restoration of lines 16–17 cf. A. M. Woodward *apud* Woodhead, *op. cit.* (note 3) 59.

Ἄντιοχίς. It is impossible to restore the names of the *grammateus* and *epistates* in lines 2–3. We thus do not know the length of the archon's name in line 3 but simply that it ended in *-ον*. The name of the proposer is uncertain: a possible restoration would be Ἄρχ[χέ]δ[εμος εἶπε·]. Then came the main proposal, almost certainly to the effect that there be alliance between the Athenians and the Eggestaians, probably followed by the text of the oath to be taken by both parties.⁷ Lines 7–10 are difficult to restore satisfactorily but clearly concern the procedure for taking the oath. Then come instructions for the inscription of the decree and the oath (lines 11–14) and finally the invitation to the Eggestaian embassy to a public reception in the *prytaneion* (lines 14–15). The decree ends with an amendment proposed by Euphemos⁸ concerning the reception of future embassies from Eggesta (lines 15–18).

The second inscription, *IG* i² 20, was likewise discovered on the Akropolis and first published by Köhler⁹ some time after his publication of *IG* i² 19, in 1879. It was not until 1943 that A. E. Raubitschek¹⁰ noticed that the first two lines of *IG* i² 20, which clearly mention Eggestaians, show letters of the same size, shape and spacing as those of *IG* i² 19. After he had confirmed that the two stones were of the same thickness, Raubitschek concluded with admirable caution that 'the connection of the two fragments may be considered as very probable'. We need, in fact, have no hesitation in believing that *IG* i² 20 stood below *IG* i² 19 on the same stele. Even so, the restoration of *IG* i² 20 remains doubtful. The letters of lines 3 ff. are of different shape and spacing from those of lines 1–2 and of *IG* i² 19. Nevertheless Raubitschek restored throughout a line of 48 letters as in *IG* i² 19:¹¹

[ἔδοχε]ν τῆι βολῆι [καὶ τοῖ δέμοι – ^{c.7} – ἐπρυτάνευε – ^{c.5} –]
 [.. ἔγραμ]μάτευε Ἄρχ[^{c.4} – – ἐπεστάτε – ^{c.7} – εἶπε· Ἐγεσταίοις]
 [καὶ ἡαλι]κναίοις Ἐλ[ύμοις συμμαχίαν εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἀρχαῖα συ]
 [γκείμεν]α τὰ πρὸς Ἀθ[εναίος. τὸ δὲ φσέφισμα τόδε ἡο γραμματεῖ]
 5 [ὕς ἡο τῆς β]ολῆς ἀναγ[ραφσάτο ἐν τῆι αὐτῆι στέλει ἐν ἡῆι ἀναγ]
 [ἔγραπται κα]ὶ περὶ Ἐ[γεσταίον τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα τοῖ δέμοι – – –].

More recently A. G. Woodhead¹² has restored in lines 3ff. a longer line of 54 letters in order to take account of the closer spacing:

[ἔδοχε]ν τῆι βολῆι [καὶ τοῖ δέμοι. ...^{c.9}... ἐπρυτάνευε, ...^{c.9}...]
 [.. ἔγραμ]μάτευε, Ἄρχ[...^{c.7}... ἐπεστάτε, ...^{c.11}... εἶπε· Ἀθηναίοις]
 [καὶ ἡαλι]κναίοις Ἐλ[ύμοις φιλίαν καὶ χουμμαχίαν εἶναι κατὰ τὰ χου]
 [γκείμεν]α τὰ πρὸς Ἀθ[εναίος ἡὰ Ἐγεσταίοις ἐστίν· ταῦτα δὲ τὸν γραμμ]
 5 [ατέα τῆς β]ολῆς ἀναγ[ράφσαι ἐμ πόλει ἐν τῆι αὐτῆι στέλει ἐν ἡῆι ἀναγ]
 [ἔγραπται κα]ὶ περὶ Ἐ[γεσταίον τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα τοῖ δέμοι *vacat*]

⁷ For an alternative restoration of lines 5–7 see R. v. Scala, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* i 57a. Despite the fact that v. Scala was doubtful of his own restoration it was adopted by Hiller (*IG* i² 19), by M. N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (=Tod) 31 and most recently by R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (=ML) 37: [ἡότινες] ἐχσορκόσοσι ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Ἐγεσταν ἡελέσθα]ι τὸ[ν] δ[έ]μον δέ[κα] ἀνδρας αὐτίκα μάλα· περ[ὶ] δέ[.]. The principal objection to v. Scala's restoration is that it leaves no room for the terms of the oath to be taken. This would be most irregular (cf. Wentker, *Sizilien und Athen* 66 f.) and it is awkward

to have to suppose, as do ML p. 81, that the terms of the oath 'were probably recorded separately on another stele, or after the end of the decree and before the envoys' names'.

⁸ The restoration *Ἐῦφε[μος]* in line 15 is practically certain. The only possible, but unlikely, alternative would be *Ἐῦφε[ρος]*, cf. *IG* i² 81.1, 348.65.

⁹ *AM* iv (1879) 30–3.

¹⁰ *TAPA* lxxv (1945) 10–14.

¹¹ *op. cit.* (note 10) 12. The difficulties of lines 2–4 in Raubitschek's restoration have been well pointed out by Woodhead, *op. cit.* (note 3) 60.

¹² *op. cit.* (note 3) 60.

It seems, however, impossible to read a definite lambda after the epsilon at the end of the preserved portion of line 3: the preserved vertical hasta allows a number of other readings besides lambda.¹³ Furthermore, what little evidence we have¹⁴ shows that Halikyai was a Sikel and not an Elymian community. This excludes the restoration 'Ελ[ύμοις]. I would accordingly suggest the following tentative restoration:

Date uncertain

ΣΤΟΙΧ 48

vacat

1 [πρέσβες] 'Εγεσται[ον³².....]
 [...?...] ικινο 'Απ[.....³⁴.....]

vacat

Date uncertain

ΣΤΟΙΧ 54

(3)1 [ἔδοχσε]ν τῆι βολῆι [καὶ τοῖ δέμοι^{ς.28}.....]
 [... ἔγραμ]μάτενε 'Αρ[.....^{ς.26}..... εἶπε· 'Αθηναίοις]
 [καὶ ἡλι]κναίοις ἔν[αι συμμαχίαν καὶ ἡόρκον κατὰ τὰ 'Εγεσταίοις συ]
 [γκείμει]α τὰ πρὸς 'Αθ[εναίους ἡοσαύτος· τὸ δὲ φσέφισμα τόδε τὸν γραμμ]
 5 [ατέα τῆς β]ολῆς ἀναγ[ράφσαι ἐμ πόλει ἐν τῆι αὐτῆι στέλει ἐν ἡῆι ἀναγ]
 [ἔγραπται κα]ῖ περι 'Ε[γεσταίον τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα τοῖ δέμοι vacat]

We thus have in the first two lines as an appendix to *IG* i² 19 what is probably a list of the ambassadors who came from Egesta. The new decree beginning at line 3, in which the names of neither the prytanising tribe, the *grammateus*, the *epistates* nor the proposer can be restored, records an alliance between Athens and Halikyai, a small Sikel settlement in the neighbourhood of Egesta, on the same terms as that between Athens and Egesta (lines 2–4). Provision is made for this decree to be inscribed on the same stele as that on which the alliance with Egesta had already been inscribed (lines 4–5).

II

The next step is to attempt to date the two decrees. It is most regrettable that in the prescript of *IG* i² 19, line 3, the letters before –ον in the archon's name have been worn smooth during the stone's long use as a threshold. Nevertheless, the last two letters provide a starting point. If one restricts one's attention, as is reasonable, to the period between the reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1 and the beginning of the second Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415, one finds five archons whose names end in –ων: 'Αβρων (458/7), 'Αρίστων (454/3), 'Επαμείνων (429/8), 'Αριστίων (421/0) and 'Αντιφών (418/7). Close examination of the two letter-spaces on the stone before –ον reveals traces of what may be a phi (φ) or a rho (ρ) preceded by an iota (ι) or a beta (β).¹⁵ It is true that these marks *might* be scratches, but until this is confirmed by study under magnification by an expert crystallographer¹⁶ let us regard them as traces of inscribed letters. This enables us to exclude 'Αρίστ[ον], 'Επαμείν[ον] and 'Αριστι[ον], so that we are left with a choice between ἡ[β]ρον (458/7) and 'Αντ[ι]φών

¹³ For this and other objections to Woodhead's restoration cf. M. T. Manni Piraino, *Kokalos* vi (1960) 58–70 with Woodhead's reply in *SEG* xxi 36. It must be admitted against Woodhead that the restoration [ἡ 'Εγεσταίους ἐστίν] in line 4 produces clumsy Greek.

¹⁴ Thuc. vii 32.1, cf. Raubitschek, *op. cit.* (note 10) 13–14, who seems to have failed to realise the signifi-

cance of his observations for his own restoration 'Ελ[ύμοις], and K. Ziegler, PW s.v. 'Halikyai' against Unger, *Philologus* xxxv (1876) 210 f.

¹⁵ Cf. W. K. Pritchett, *AJA* lix (1955) 59; H. B. Mattingly, *Historia* xii (1963) 268–9.

¹⁶ Cf. W. K. Pritchett, *Hesperia* xxxiv (1965) 132–3 n. 7.

(418/7). The shape and position of the traces seem marginally to favour the $\iota\phi$ of $\text{'Av}\tau\text{]}_{\iota\phi\delta\nu}$ rather than the $\beta\rho$ of $\text{h}\acute{\alpha}\text{]}_{\beta\rho\nu}$,¹⁷ but there is one serious epigraphical objection of a general nature against reading $\text{'Av}\tau\text{]}_{\iota\phi\delta\nu}$. Russell Meiggs' recent study of letter-forms in fifth century Athenian inscriptions has established that in definitely dated inscriptions three-barred sigmas (ζ) do not occur after *c.* 445 and tailed rounded rhos (**R**) not after 438.¹⁸ Yet both these forms occur in *IG* i² 19+. Accordingly, what now for long will be the standard edition of important fifth century and earlier Greek inscriptions¹⁹ retains Raubitschek's date of the archonship of Habron (458/7) for *IG* i² 19+.

There is at first sight much that is difficult about an Athenian alliance with Eggesta as early as 458/7. Athens was then busy winning control of the Saronic Gulf and supporting the Egyptian revolt against Persia (Thuc. i 104–106). Her influence in the Corinthian Gulf was still minimal. It is true that alliance with Megara had given her Pegai (Thuc. i 103.4),²⁰ but she had not yet settled the Messenians at Naupaktos,²¹ had no secure landing points on the north-west coast from Oiniadai (*cf.* Thuc. i 111.3)²² to Kerkyra, no alliances with cities in S. Italy and E. Sicily²³ and had not yet even achieved her first *periplous* of the Peloponnese (Thuc. i 108.5).²⁴ How in these circumstances could she possibly make a meaningful alliance with a remote Elymian city in W. Sicily? Of course, it was the Eggestaians who came and asked for alliance and the Athenians in the enthusiasm of the *annus mirabilis* of the Erechtheid casualty list (*IG* i² 929)²⁵ might have thought that they had nothing to lose by offering the Eggestaians token alliance in the most general terms. The difficulty lies rather in understanding why in 458/7 the *Eggestaians* were prepared to seek help so far afield as Athens. Their danger, of which we know nothing,²⁶ must have been considerable and their isolation nearer home in Sicily quite total. Surely they, at least, must have considered their mission worthwhile. Furthermore, at least one man at Athens itself, Euphemos, as we can see from his rider in *IG* i² 19, lines 15–18, expected further embassies from Eggesta and made provision for their proper reception. And yet what self-deception was this on both sides at a time when it was practically impossible for Athens to send fighting forces to W. Sicily!

¹⁷ *Cf.* H. B. Mattingly, *op. cit.* (note 15) 268–9. B. Meritt, *BCH* lxxxviii (1964) 413–15 showed that Pritchett's earlier arguments, *op. cit.* (note 15) 59, against reading β were not strong and argued himself that the position of the epsilon immediately above the disputed vertical hasta or scratch in fact suggested that β should be read rather than ι , τ or ϕ . Meritt's observations, together with Pritchett's reply, *op. cit.* (note 16) 132–3 n. 7, have made it impossible for purely epigraphical considerations to decide our choice between $\text{h}\acute{\alpha}\text{]}_{\beta\rho\nu}$ (458/7) and $\text{'Av}\tau\text{]}_{\iota\phi\delta\nu}$ (418/7).

¹⁸ *JHS* lxxxvi (1966) 86–98, especially Table 1, p. 92.

¹⁹ ML 37.

²⁰ The date of the Athenian alliance with Megara is uncertain, but it must fall before 458/7.

²¹ I would in general support the arguments of D. W. Reece, *JHS* lxxxii (1962) 111–20.

²² Late summer 455 would seem to be the earliest possible date for Perikles' unsuccessful attack on Oiniadai.

²³ S. Accame (*Riv. Fil.* lxxiii [1935] 73), arguing from historical probability and the use of *παλαιός* in Thuc. iii 86.3 *κατά τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν*, wished to make Athenian alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi,

which he dated *c.* 460, precede alliance with Eggesta. I agree with the argument from historical probability that alliance with Rhegion and/or Leontinoi *should* precede alliance with Eggesta. Thuc. iii 86.3 *κατά τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν* is difficult, but I do not believe that it can be used to support individual, formal alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi earlier than 433/2. See further Appendix, pp. 144–6.

²⁴ The probable date of Tolmides' *periplous* is late summer, 456. See above note 21.

²⁵ *IG* i² 929 almost certainly records casualties of the 458 campaigning season, *cf.* A. W. Gomme, *Commentary on Thucydides* i 412 n. 2.

²⁶ Diodoros xi 86.2 records under the archonship of Ariston (454/3) a war between the Eggestaians and the Lilybaitai: *κατά δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν Ἐγχεσταίους καὶ Λιλυβαίταις ἐνέστη πόλεμος περὶ χώρας τῆς πρὸς τῷ Μαζάρῳ ποταμῷ*. As Lilybaion was not founded until 396 after the destruction of Motye, scholars have been unwilling to leave his text alone (but *cf.* Ziegler PW s.v. 'Lilybaion', Wentker, *op. cit.* [note 7] 59 for the possibility that the later town was named after the inhabitants of the area who had long been called Lilybaitai). *Λιλυβαίταις* has been emended to *Ἀλικυαίοις* (first by Köhler, *op. cit.* [note 9] 31–2) and \langle πρὸς Σελιωνντίους \rangle been inserted into the text

A second objection is slightly more complicated. If one allows consideration of letter-forms to compel the dating of *IG* i² 19+ to 458/7, then one can hardly not allow the same consideration to compel the dating of *IG* i² 20–, the alliance between Athens and Halikyai, to the last third of the fifth century. The letter-forms of this decree would seem by orthodox criteria to fit best ± 420 .²⁷ One is thus obliged first to find a satisfactory occasion ± 420 for an alliance between Athens and Halikyai and secondly to explain why this alliance was to be on the same terms as that made between Athens and Egesta about thirty years before and was to be inscribed on the same stone. Raubitschek, following Classen's interpretation of Thuc. vi 6.2 (τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Δάχρητος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου [Λεοντίων]²⁸ οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἀναμνησκόντες), believed that the Egestaians had renewed their alliance with Athens in 427/6 and supposed them at that time to have arranged a similar alliance to their own between Athens and their neighbours at Halikyai.²⁹ This would give both a satisfactory date for the Halikyai alliance and a satisfactory explanation of its inscription beneath the earlier Egesta alliance. Unfortunately, however, Raubitschek's position rests, as we shall see, upon an untenable interpretation of Thuc. vi 6.2. Woodhead realised this and proposed instead *c.* 433/2 as a possible date for the same series of events.³⁰ It is true that in that year Athens made, almost certainly for the first time,³¹ alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi (*IG* i² 51 and 52). But it is by no means certain, as Woodhead wants to believe, that general renewal of existing western alliances was then Athenian policy or that there had been active Athenian diplomacy in the West.³² After Korinth and Sparta had encouraged Syracuse to form a Dorian front in Sicily,³³ the Chalkidian (i.e.

after ἐνέστη πόλεμος (first by Beloch, *Hermes* xxviii [1893] 630). But all of this is highly uncertain. It would now appear to be difficult to date the Athenian alliance with Halikyai (*IG* i² 20–) before *c.* 430 (see below note 27) and the most recent editor of the inscription from Temple G at Selinus suggests for this a date after the Athenian defeat in Sicily in 413 (W. Calder, *The Inscription from Temple G at Selinus* [GRBS Monograph no. 4], cf. *GRBS* v [1964] 113–19 and *ML* 38). In any case, we simply do not know if whatever it was that happened in 454/3 had been brewing since the early 450s or not (*contra* S. Accame, *Riv. Fil.* lxxx [1952] 127–35, Wentker, *op. cit.* [note 7] 60).

²⁷ Cf. Raubitschek, *op. cit.* (note 10) n. 10. The early view that *IG* i² 19+ and 20– must belong to the same year, or at least to the same historical context (cf. Lolling, *op. cit.* [note 2] 106) has recently been revived by M. T. Manni Piraino, *op. cit.* (note 13). Her theory is open to the objection that no orthodox epigraphist would want to put the letter-forms of *IG* i² 20– as early as the 450s. Mattingly, *op. cit.* (note 15) 273 n. 76, concludes in much the same way from the absence of the archon's name in the prescript of *IG* i² 20– that the two decrees belong to the same year, 418/7.

²⁸ For Steup's summary of Classen's reasons for removing *Λεοντίων* from the text see Classen-Steup, *Thuk.* vi Anhang 249.

²⁹ *op. cit.* (note 10) 14.

³⁰ *op. cit.* (note 3) 60.

³¹ Cf. *ML* 63 and 64. Meiggs and Lewis admit that the hypothesis of renewal of treaties concluded earlier in the 440s hardly gives a satisfactory explanation of the reinscribed prescripts. See Appendix

pp. 144–6 for a full treatment of the question.

³² The date of Diotimos' visit to Neapolis (scholiast on Lykophron, *Alexandra* 732–3, cf. Tzetzēs ad loc.) is quite uncertain. It would seem unwise to place too much weight on Tzetzēs' words, ὁ Διότιμος δὲ εἰς Νεάπολιν ἦλθεν, ὅτε στρατηγὸς ὢν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπολέμει τοῖς Σικελοῖς and insist that the visit be dated to the 450s (cf. De Sanctis, *Riv. Fil.* lxxiii [1935] 71–2; M. T. Manni Piraino, *op. cit.* [note 13] 64–5). We know that Diotimos served as general at the battle of Sybota in 433 (Thuc. i 45.2 cf. *IG* i² 295+ = *ML* 61) and it is possible that his journey westwards be dated then (see Raubitschek, *op. cit.* [note 10] 10 n. 4) in complete disregard of Tzetzēs' words ὅτε ἐπολέμει τοῖς Σικελοῖς. But it is surely just as likely that the visit occurred sometime during the first or second Sicilian expedition with Tzetzēs' στρατηγὸς ὢν simply a wrong guess and Σικελοῖς a mistake for Σικελιώταις. A further possibility would be that Diotimos was a colleague of Phaiax in 422 (Thuc. v 4.1).

³³ Korinthian and Spartan diplomatic activity in Sicily may well have begun very soon after the battle of Sybota in August 433 and extended through the following winter: cf. *ML* p. 173 for correct emphasis on the aorist participle at Thuc. ii 7.2, τοῖς τάκεινων ἐλομένοις.

Nothing obliges us to put the alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi before spring 432. Athens' alliance with Akarnania (Thuc. ii 68.8) was likewise probably concluded in spring 432 (cf. Wade-Gery, *JHS* lii [1932] 216 n. 45, Gomme, *Commentary* ii ad loc.) and was defensive rather than offensive in purpose.

Ionian) cities of Rhegion and Leontinoi might well have been frightened into sending embassies of their own accord³⁴ to the 'Ionian metropolis', Athens, embassies which the Athenians could not refuse but which they had little hope in the immediate circumstances of satisfying.³⁵ There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the non-Greek cities of Egesta and Halikyai regarded themselves as involved in the impending inter-Greek hostilities in Sicily or felt any necessity to strengthen or conclude alliances with Athens.

It is strange that no supporter of 458/7 for the alliance with Egesta has so far suggested 416/5 for its renewal and the new alliance with Halikyai, i.e. for *IG* i² 20-. But it was then that Egestaians were *certainly* present at Athens pleading for help against Selinous (Thuc. vi 6.2-3). A suitable opportunity for negotiations leading to alliance with Halikyai would occur while there were Athenians in the neighbourhood at Egesta investigating that city's financial resources (Thuc. vi 6.3, 7.1, 46.3-4). The date of 416/5 would fit admirably the first and only reference to Halikyai as ally of Athens in Thucydides' account of the 413 campaign in Sicily (vii 32.1). Furthermore, one could satisfactorily explain the inscription of the Halikyai alliance beneath the forty-year-old Egesta alliance by the supposition that in 416/5 the Egestaians had reminded the Athenians of their old alliance and, in effect, had had it renewed. To have a new alliance now made with Halikyai on the same terms as their own alliance forty years ago and, moreover, to have this new alliance inscribed beneath the forty-year-old inscription recording their own original alliance would have meant for the Egestaians clear Athenian recognition that their own old alliance still held good.

However, before this final suggestion is accepted as a reasonable reconciliation of the epigraphical and the literary evidence, let us look carefully at the much-discussed passage Thuc. vi 6.2:

ὥστε τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ Λάχητος καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολέμου Λεοντίνων οἱ Ἐγισταῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἀναμνησκόντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐδέοντο σφίσι ναὺς πέμψαντες ἐπαμύναι.

This must be translated: 'so that the Egestaians, making *repeated* (ἀναμνησκόντες) mention of the (*sc.* Athenian) alliance concluded with Leontinoi at the time of Laches and the previous war, kept asking the Athenians to send ships and come to their (*sc.* the Egestaians') aid'. What commentators have found surprising is that the Egestaians appeal not to an alliance between themselves and Athens but to one between Leontinoi and Athens. Accordingly, Classen, Poppo-Stahl, Busolt³⁶ and, most recently by implication, Raubitschek,³⁷ have all supported the deletion of *Λεοντίνων* and supposed an alliance, or rather renewal of alliance, between Athens and Egesta *c.* 427/6, an alliance unfortunately not mentioned earlier by Thucydides in his account of the first Sicilian expedition. An alternative to such drastic deletion has been the suggestion that *Λεοντίνων* be taken as a subjective or defining genitive with *πόλεμου* rather than with *ξυμμαχίαν*.³⁸ But subjective or defining genitives with *πόλεμος* are rare in Attic Greek, and particularly in Thucydides,³⁹ and the difficulty of Thucydides' earlier failure to mention such an Athenian-Egestaian alliance remains. Steup retained *Λεοντίνων* with *ξυμμαχίαν* and revived the old view that Thucydides meant the Egestaians

³⁴ We do not know when the war referred to in Thuc. iii 86.2 broke out. It is at least possible that it was already threatening in 433 when Sparta and Corinth tightened their connection with Syracuse and the Dorian cities in Sicily. This would then have further encouraged Rhegion and Leontinoi in their appeal to Athens.

³⁵ See Appendix p. 146 for further treatment of the Athenian attitude towards Rhegion and Leontinoi in spring 432.

³⁶ *Griechische Geschichte* iii 1275 n. 1.

³⁷ *op. cit.* (note 10) 14.

³⁸ Cf. E. Roos, *Opuscula Atheniensi* iv (1962) 12-15 for a detailed examination of this possibility.

³⁹ Cf. K. J. Dover, *Proc. of Camb. Phil. Soc.* clxxxiii N.S. 3 (1954-5) 4. Roos, *op. cit.* (note 38) 14 gives only one example from Thucydides, i 181.4 *τίς οὖν ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος;*

to be referring to an *Egestaian*, rather than an Athenian, alliance with Leontinoi made c. 427/6.⁴⁰ But, if it is illogical for A's appeal to X to depend upon B's previous alliance with X, it is surely just as illogical for A's appeal to X to depend upon A's previous alliance with B, especially, once again, when the latter is otherwise unattested. The most recent commentator on the passage, K. J. Dover,⁴¹ has insisted that Thucydides must be allowed to mean what he says—that the Egestaians based their request for Athenian aid upon Athens' previous alliance with Leontinoi—and he points out that the abnormal word-order and juxtaposition of *Λεοντίνων οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι* exactly conveys Thucydides' own sense of the logical and diplomatic outrage involved. But Dover does not ask why the Egestaians did not appeal to *their own* old alliance with Athens. For Jowett⁴² in his blessed disregard of *IG* i² 19 and 20 the answer was simple: Egesta, having had no previous alliance with Athens, first concluded one now in 416/5, sometime between the appeal of Thuc. vi 6.2 and the first unambiguous, if ironical, reference to the Egestaians as allies of Athens at vi 10.5 (*cf.* 13.2, 33.2, 77.1), probably at the assembly described at vi 8.2. This view has the clear support of Diodoros' source for the circumstances of the Egestaian appeal, xii 82.7:

οἱ δ' Ἐγεσταῖοι ταπεινωθέντες καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς οὐκ ὄντες ἀξιόμαχοι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον Ἀκραγαντίνους καὶ Συρακοσίους ἔπειθον συμμαχεῖσθαι· ἀποτυχόντες δὲ τούτων ἐξέπεμψαν πρεσβευτὰς εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, δεόμενοι βοηθηῖσθαι· οὐ προσεχόντων δ' αὐτῶν, ἐζήτουν τινα διαπόντιον συμμαχίαν· οἷς συνήργησε ταυτόματον.

and xii 83.3:

παραγενομένων οὖν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας τῶν πρέσβειων, καὶ τῶν μὲν Λεοντίνων τὴν συγγένειαν προφερομένων καὶ τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν συμμαχίαν, τῶν δ' Ἐγεσταίων ἐπαγγελλομένων χρημάτων τε πλήθος δώσειν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ συμμαχεῖσθαι κατὰ τῶν Συρακοσίων, ἔδοξε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐκπέμψαι τινὰς τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν καὶ διασκέψασθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν νῆσον καὶ τοὺς Ἐγεσταίους.

The difference here between the Leontinoi who were already allies and the Egestaians who were not is clearly marked by the antithesis *τῶν μὲν Λεοντίνων . . . τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν συμμαχίαν, τῶν δ' Ἐγεσταίων κτλ.* However, in the presence of *IG* i² 19 and 20 Jowett's simple explanation of the literary tradition is clearly no longer tenable. The orthodox supporter of 458/7 for the Egesta alliance must now adopt one of a number of more complicated attitudes. He can simply and fashionably ignore Diodoros; he can excuse Thucydides' ignorance of a forty-year-old alliance; and he can even maintain that so old an alliance—and moreover a 'stone-alliance' never acted upon—was as good as dead and not worth appealing to by the Egestaians. However, one should feel *some* discomfort, at least, in ignoring Diodoros. As for Thucydides, he not merely does not mention any previous alliance between Athens and Egesta but his words seem positively to indicate that there was no such alliance.⁴³ Finally, as far as the age and validity of the alliance is concerned, in an

⁴⁰ Classen-Steup, Thuk. vi Anhang 249, *cf.* the conclusion of Roos, *op. cit.* (note 38) 20.

⁴¹ A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* iv 221. I cannot agree with Dover's alternative suggestion that *τὴν γενομένην Λεοντίνων συμμαχίαν* might mean not 'the act of alliance which was made' but 'the fighting-on-the-same-side which occurred'. Dover can cite no good parallel for such a usage of *συμμαχία*: the more usual, precise use is found at e.g. Thuc. ii 68.7–8, *cf.* further Steup's arguments against Classen in Classen-Steup, Thuk. vi Anhang 249.

⁴² *Commentary on Thucydides* ii 344.

⁴³ The definite implication of Thuc. vi 6.2, *Λεοντίνων οἱ Ἐγεσταῖοι συμμαχίαν ἀναμνησκόντες*, is that the Egestaians at least did not mention any earlier alliance of their own with Athens. I shall argue below that at the time of the initial appeal referred to by these words, i.e. in 418/7, Egesta did not in fact have any alliance of its own with Athens. On the other hand, Thucydides probably intended the Egestaians to be included in *τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις συμμαχοῖς* (vi 6.1, *cf.* Dover, *op. cit.* [note 41] ad loc.), with *τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐτι συμμαχοῦς* and *τῶν ὑπολοίπων*

atmosphere of Athenian concern to emulate their fathers' glorious achievements (Thuc. vi 17.7, 18.6) it would have shown treacherous negligence on the part of the Egestaian embassy in 416 not to have been continually reminding the Athenians of the alliance of their fathers with Egesta and the oath they had sworn in the archonship of Habron, preserved on stone and standing on the Akropolis; it is not as if the alliance had been forgotten, if one adopts Woodhead's or Raubitschek's date of 433/2 or 427/6 respectively for its renewal, or, if one prefers the third alternative of 416/5 suggested above, was to remain forgotten. E. Roos suggested in desperation that *IG* i² 19+ recorded a treaty of friendship rather than full alliance and noted that 'there is, in fact, in the whole inscription not a single letter preserved of the word *χουμμαχία*'.⁴⁴ This enabled him, while allowing that from the 450s onwards there existed a treaty of friendship (*IG* i² 19+) with Egesta, to date the first conclusion of an Athenian *συμμαχία* with Egesta to the assembly described in Thuc. vi 8.2 and so to satisfy the implication of Thuc. vi 6.2 and the clear statement of D. S. xii 82.7 and 83.3. However, even this last attempt must be judged to have failed, as no such treaties of friendship are known from the fifth century.⁴⁵

Such perplexity methodologically justifies a return to the beginning and a re-examination of major premisses. Of the two archons' names possible in *IG* i² 19, line 3, *ἡά]βρον* and *Ἄντ]ιφόν*, the second was excluded because two letter-forms found in *IG* i² 19+, the three-barred sigma (ϛ) and the tailed rounded rho (R), do not occur in dated Athenian inscriptions after c. 445 and 438 respectively. Let us for the moment, desperately rather than rebelliously, suppose that this fact is insufficient to exclude the possibility of restoring *Ἄντ]ιφόν* and of thus dating the Athenian alliance with Egesta to 418/7. This date is historically as eminently suitable as 458/7 was shown above to be unsuitable. Athens by now had a long-established centre of influence in the Korinthian Gulf at Messenian-held Naupaktos.⁴⁶ She was in occupation of Pylos⁴⁷ and had full control of the *periplous* of the Peloponnese. Secure landing points were available from Oiniadai⁴⁸ to Kerkyra.⁴⁹ She had been in alliance with Rhegion and Leontinoi since 433/2⁵⁰ and militarily present in Sicily itself from 427 to 424.⁵¹ In 425 a total Athenian fleet of 60 ships⁵² had operated in Sicilian waters and as recently as 422 the Athenians had been diplomatically active in Sicily and S. Italy.⁵³ It was thus quite natural in 418/7 for the Egestaians to appeal to Athens for help against Selinous and for an alliance to be concluded. The demagogue Archedemos *ὁ γλάμων*⁵⁴ would fit admirably as the proposer of the main decree in *IG* i² 19 line 3 and Euphemos, Athenian ambassador to Kamarina in winter 415/4,⁵⁵ as the author of the rider in lines 15–17.

ἐτι ξυμμαχων (vi 6.2) deliberately left vague. The first passage refers to the post-alliance situation of 416/5 and in the second and third Thucydides has already slipped dishonestly by the alliance into the post-alliance situation of 417–16. See further below p. 136 and Appendix p. 146 for the *Tendenz* implicit here.

⁴⁴ *op. cit.* (note 38) 22.

⁴⁵ ML p. 82.

⁴⁶ Naupaktos was first captured by the Athenians in late summer, 456 (see above note 21), first used as an Athenian naval base in winter 430/29 (Thuc. ii 69.1) and, despite a number of Spartan attempts (*cf.* Thuc. ii 80.1, iii 100), not recaptured from the Messenians until 401/0 (D. S. xiv 34).

⁴⁷ Pylos was held from 425 (Thuc. iv 3 ff.) with a Messenian and/or Athenian garrison (Thuc. iv 41, *cf.* v 35, 56) until it was recaptured by the Spartans, possibly in 409 (D. S. xiii 64.5–7).

⁴⁸ Oiniadai was finally won for Athens in 424

(Thuc. iv 77) after a number of unsuccessful earlier attempts to capture it (Thuc. i 111, *cf.* above note 22, and iii 7).

⁴⁹ In alliance with Athens since 433 (Thuc. i 44) and further committed to Athens after the victory of the Athenian party in the stasis of 427–25 (Thuc. iv 48), Kerkyra sent troops to fight on the Athenian side in Sicily in 413 (Thuc. vii 57.7).

⁵⁰ *Cf.* above note 31.

⁵¹ Thuc. iii 86, 90, 99, 103, 115, iv 2.2, 24–5, 48.6, 58–65.

⁵² The first expedition consisted of 20 ships (Thuc. iii 86.1); later, an additional 40 ships were voted (iii 115.4) and sent (iv 2.2).

⁵³ Thuc. v 4–5.

⁵⁴ For Archedemos and the evidence for his activity during the period 421–15 see Mattingly, *op. cit.* (note 15) 270 n. 65.

⁵⁵ Thuc. vi 75.4, 81–8. I would suggest identity of this Euphemos with the archon of 417/6 (D. S. xii

However, at first sight an alliance in 418/7 would seem to be even more incompatible with the implications of Thuc. vi 6.2 than one in 458/7. Whatever could have possessed the Eggestaian ambassadors in 416 to ignore their own recent alliance with Athens and continually mention instead the Athenian alliance with Leontinoi? The solution must be that, in giving the background in vi 6 to the Athenian intention—announced already at vi 1.1 and picked up again at vi 6.3—to attempt interference in Sicily, Thucydides is not as chronologically precise as he might have been.⁵⁶ Normally he is quite careful with indications of time when giving the background material.⁵⁷ However, in vi 6, although he admits that the Eggestaians were by no means immediately successful with their appeals to the Athenians (vi 6.3, ὦν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων πολλάκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς ἐψηφίσαντο πρέσβεις πέμψαι), he fails to make clear that their initial reference to Athens' previous alliance with Leontinoi (vi 6.2) was in order to secure alliance for themselves *as early as 418/7* and that they and their Athenian supporters then had to appeal to the Athenians to act upon that alliance *again and again* (vi 6.3) until well into 416. We should expect such chronological compression from Diodoros, and indeed we get it at xii 82.7 and 83.3, wrongly, but quite typically included under 416/5, the date of the 'peg' event, the Athenian decision to interfere in Sicily, but we should not have expected it from Thucydides.⁵⁸ It may be that the fault is not Thucydides' own; his source may have failed to make clear to him the precise course of events. But one cannot help suspecting that Thucydides himself has preferred to leave in obscurity the whole question of when precisely in the events leading up to the Sicilian expedition the Athenians made their alliance with Eggesta. For him to have admitted that the Athenian *demos* wavered first one way and then the other and for so long resisted the appeals of the Eggestaians would have spoiled the impression he otherwise wishes to give of an ignorant, impassioned *demos* rushing to its ruin.⁵⁹

It is now time to return to *IG* i² 19+, lines 4–7 (see above note 7). If it is granted that Athenian alliance with Eggesta followed after the Eggestaian appeal of Thuc. vi 6.2 in 418/7, then the following restoration becomes possible:

5 [μος εἶπε· χσμμαχίαν καὶ ἡόρκον⁶⁰ Ἀθηναίους κατὰ] ταὐτὸ Ἀ[εον]
 [τίνοις ἔναι καὶ Ἐγεστα]ίο[ις· κατὰ δὲ τάδε ὁμόσαι] Ἀ[θηναίος· σ]
 [ύμμαχοι ἐσόμεθα Ἐγεσταίοις ἐς αἰῶδιον πιστο]ί, τὸ[ς]⁶¹ δ[ὲ Ἐγεστ]
 [αίος ὁμόσαι ἡοσαύτος· π]ερ[ὶ δὲ τ]ο[...]

81.1, *IG* i² 96.3, etc.). He probably served on the *boule* in 420/19 (cf. Meritt, *Hesperia* xxi [1952] 344 ff.; Mattingly, *op. cit.* [note 15] 268 n. 53). His later diplomatic service at Kamarina suggests that he might have been present with Phaiax in 422 (Thuc. v 4.6), worked on Phaiax' behalf in securing the Eggestaian embassy an audience in 417 (see below p. 142 with note 113) and used his position as archon in 417/6 to give underhand assistance in securing the ostracism of Hyperbolos (see below p. 143). For the archon's function at the *ostrakophoria* see Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F 30; Plut. *Aristeid.* 7.6; Andok. iv 7.

⁵⁶ The τε at Thuc. vi 6.2 Ἐγεσταίων τε πρέσβεις παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι, awkwardly picked up later at vi 6.3 τῶν τε Ἐγεσταίων πολλάκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ξαναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς (see Classen's views wrongly rejected by Steup in Classen-Steup ad loc.) would seem to betray excessive compression in Thucydides at this point in working in his background material.

⁵⁷ Cf. Thuc. iii 34.1–2, 86.2–3, v. 4.2–4.

⁵⁸ But there is in Thuc. i 57–8 (cf. Gomme, *Commentary* i ad loc.) chronological awkwardness similar to that which may be present in vi 6.2.

⁵⁹ For Thucydides' view that the Athenians had been interested in the possibility of extending their *arche* to Sicily as early as winter 434/3 see below p. 144, note 126. For his insistence on the ignorance, stupidity and passion of the Athenian *demos* in 415 cf. vi 1.1, 6.1, 8.2, 8.4, 9–13, 15.1, 19.1, 24–6. It is interesting to note the occurrence throughout vi 1–26 of *δρμᾶσθαι* (6.1, 19.1, 24.2), *ἐφιέσθαι* (6.1, 6.4, 11.5), *ἐπιθυμία* (10.1, 13.1, 24.2, 24.4, cf. 15.2, 15.4), *δρέγεσθαι* (10.5, cf. 16.6) and *ἔρωσ* (13.1, 24.3).

⁶⁰ Cf. above note 3 for McGregor's attractive restoration of [χσμμαχία καὶ ἡόρ]κο[ς] in line 1.

⁶¹ The article with plural ethnics is rare (cf. D. M. Lewis, *BSA* xlix [1954] 23 quoting Meisterhans, *GAI*³ 120 n. 12) but, as Lewis notes, there is at least one secure instance in *SEG* x 69.3, τ[ο]ίς [Μντιλεν]αίους.

IG i² 20– will now follow either in the same year of 418/7 (see above note 27) or later in 416/5 (see above p. 133) and the restoration [*ἐς ἀτθίων*] becomes possible, perhaps preferable, instead of [*ἠοσαύτος*] in line 4 (see above p. 130).

We are, however, still faced with the problem of the letter-forms of *IG* i² 19+. From 446 to 431 Meiggs⁶² lists 55 dated Attic inscriptions which show the four-barred sigma (*ξ*), 52 of which also show the tailless rounded rho (*Ρ*). There is just one isolated ‘wild’ tailed rho (*ῤ*) in the final Parthenon account of 438, *IG* i² 354. How, if one dates *IG* i² 19+ to 418/7, is one to explain this earlier consistent series of decrees from 446 to 431 showing more advanced letter-forms than *IG* i² 19+? There are three earlier inscriptions which may help to suggest a solution to our problem:

- A. an inscription on the altar of Apollo in the Pythion dedicated by Peisistratos, son of Hippias (ML 11)
- B. an inscription in the same hand on a dedication at the Ptoion sanctuary in Boiotia by Hipparchos, brother of Hippias (*BCH* xlv [1920] 237 f., cf. ML 11, commentary)
- C. an inscription on a memorial of Kallimachos, polemarch at Marathon (ML 18).

It is generally acknowledged that A and B are to be dated *c.* 520,⁶³ whereas C is to be dated thirty years later *c.* 490/89 soon after the battle of Marathon;⁶⁴ and yet the older inscriptions, A and B, show more advanced letter-forms than C. The only possible explanation is that the Peisistratids ‘chose a craftsman who was ahead of most of his contemporaries’.⁶⁵ Now, if one looks again at Meiggs’ 57 dated inscriptions from 446 to 431, one can see that 42 of them are in fact account-lists: quota lists 9–15 from the first stele and 16–23 (excluding 18) from the second (cf. ML 39), the single stele carrying accounts 1–15 for the Parthenon (cf. ML 59), 7 of the surviving accounts seemingly on separate stelai for the chryselaphantine statue of Athene (cf. ML 54) and the single stele carrying accounts 1–6 for the Propylaia (cf. ML 60). It would be reasonable to assume that the job of recording lists in the same series was given year after year to the same master mason and his assistants. This need not necessarily, and clearly did not in fact,⁶⁶ mean that the same individual mason was regularly employed on the same series, but simply that the same master mason regularly got the contract. Our lists constitute four series, three of which concern the Parthenon building programme—the Parthenon, Parthenon and Propylaia. Would it not be at least possible to suppose that the same group of masons working under Pheidias was responsible for them all? And may not Perikles have used his influence to secure for his friend Pheidias,⁶⁷ at least from *c.* 447 onwards,⁶⁸ the further contract for the year-by-year inscription of the quota lists? And were not Pheidias and his assistants ‘craftsmen who were ahead of most of their contemporaries’? It is quite reasonable to believe that when Pheidias was at Athens and the Akropolis building programme in full swing, there were many fine craftsmen available at Athens for incidental work on public inscriptions. However, in the late 430s the trial of

⁶² *op. cit.* (note 18) 92, Table 1. But note the so-called ‘archaising’ *horos* stone from the agora, archaeologically dated to the 420s and yet showing a tailed rho (Meritt, *Hesperia* xxxvii [1968] 291 no. 33).

⁶³ The alternative suggestions of Meritt, *Hesperia* viii (1939) 62–5 and Raubitschek, *Dedications from the Athenian Akropolis* 449 ff., of a later date in the 490s for ML 11 have been well answered by L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* 75 and ML p. 20.

⁶⁴ For proof that the whole inscription is subsequent to 490 see B. Shefton, *BSA* xlv (1950) 140–64, whose solution of the problem of ἀν]έθεκεν would appear to be the best so far suggested.

⁶⁵ ML p. 20.

⁶⁶ It is clear from e.g. *ATL* frag. 92 from the first stele (see the photograph in *ATL* i 45, fig. 58) that quota lists 9 and 10 were almost certainly not inscribed by the same mason.

⁶⁷ Cf. *Plut. Per.* 13.6, 14–15.

⁶⁸ The early career of Pheidias is obscure, especially as it would now seem certain that Pheidias worked at Elis after working at Athens rather than *vice versa*, cf. G. M. A. Richter, *Hesperia* xxxv (1966) 167 n. 5 quoting E. Kunze in *Neue Deutsche Ausgrabungen im Mittelmeergebiet*, 268 ff.

Pheidias,⁶⁹ the prospect of the end of the building programme, the fear of war and finally war itself and the plague no doubt encouraged many of the better, itinerant masons to leave Athens. They left behind them, to be satisfied by a greater percentage of local masons more conservative than themselves, an increasing demand for the publication of decrees by inscription on stone. In these circumstances it would not be surprising that from *c.* 430 onwards one should suddenly discover in public inscriptions, intermingled with the new, some old letter-forms re-emerging.

But this may not satisfy the professional epigraphist. What one needs to secure the date of 418/7 for *IG* i² 19+ is one or two firmly dated inscriptions from *c.* 420 with three-barred sigmas and the rest. Until these are discovered or shown conclusively not to exist, nagging uncertainty concerning the date of *IG* i² 19+ and many other crucial fifth-century inscriptions will remain.

III

However, it cannot be denied that to date *IG* i² 19+ to 418/7 would fit admirably into what we know of the internal political situation at Athens between 421 and 415 and it is perhaps worthwhile to conclude with a possible reconstruction of the history of this period on the *hypothesis* that *IG* i² 19+ is to be dated to 418/7. It was a time of intense political rivalry between Hyperbolos, Nikias, Alkibiades and Phaiax. Deeply involved in this rivalry was the question of whether or not to send an expedition to Sicily, so that to understand fully the position in 421–15 one must first understand the development of earlier Athenian involvement in the West.

This had begun, if my interpretation of the inscriptional evidence is correct, with Athenian support for the foundation of the 'third' Sybaris in 446/5.⁷⁰ However, after the failure of the 'third' Sybaris and the foundation of the truly panhellenic Thourioi⁷¹ in 444/3

⁶⁹ The date of Pheidias' trial is uncertain, but *cf.* O. Lendle, *Hermes* lxxxiii (1955) 284–303 for good arguments in favour of 432/1.

⁷⁰ For the foundation of the 'second' Sybaris in 453/2 see D. S. xi 90.3–4. It seems clear that Diodoros xii 10–11 in his account of the foundation of the 'third' Sybaris in 446/5 and the subsequent foundation of Thourioi (correctly dated to 444/3 by Plut. 835d and wrongly included by Diodoros under the same year as the 'third' Sybaris, i.e. 446/5) has badly muddled the details of what were in fact two separate foundations. For a thorough treatment of the whole question see Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* iii 523, n. 3.

It is interesting that the expelled Sybarites appealed in 446/5 to the Spartans before the Athenians (D. S. xii 10.3). That the Athenians took up their appeal (D. S. xii 10.4) may be explained not by the supposition of nascent imperialistic ambitions in the West but by their need to stand by their supporters in the Peloponnese, especially in Achaia, whom they were about to sacrifice to Sparta in accordance with the terms of the Thirty Years Peace (Thuc. i 115.1): to send them off to S. Italy was to rid themselves of an embarrassment, *cf.* Edmonds, *The Fragments of Attic Comedy* i 38 for the possible association of Kratinos' *Drapetides* with the 'flight to the West' of 445–43, rejected by V. Ehrenberg, *AJP* lxxix (1948) 164 n. 53. One can hardly hold the Athenians at home respon-

sible for the reaction of the newcomers to their subsequent domination by the original Sybarites (D. S. xii 11.1–2).

⁷¹ For Thourioi as a truly panhellenic foundation see Wade-Gery, *op. cit.* (note 33) 217–18, who attributes its panhellenism to Thucydides, son of Melesias. Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* (note 70) 160–1 rejects the evidence for Thucydides' trial on his return for 'New Sybaris' (*Anon. Life of Thuc.* 7) and supposes a confusion with Thucydides' later trial in Aristophanes' *Ach.* 702 ff. Ehrenberg's own reasons for detecting in the establishment of Thourioi Perikleian imperialism behind a façade of panhellenism seem to me to be weak. If one accepts Seager's justified scepticism about Perikles' supposed Congress Decree (*Historia* xviii [1969] 129–41), then little evidence remains for Perikleian panhellenism. In the particular case of Thourioi, Protagoras was doubtless a friend of Perikles (Plut. *Per.* 36.5, Plato, *Protag.* 314e–15a) but the extent of his legislative activity at Thourioi is uncertain (Diog. Laert. ix 8.50, 'Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Πόντικος . . . καὶ Θουρίους νόμους γράψαι φησὶν αὐτὸν [sc. *Πρωταγόραν*], but *cf.* D. S. xii 11.3 for Charondas as *nomothetes* without mention of Protagoras); both Lampon and Xenokritos (D. S. xii 10.4) opposed Thucydides (*cf.* Plut. *Per.* 6.2–3, *Anon. Life of Thuc.* 7) but as there seem to have been a whole host of others involved, *cf.* Photios, s.v. 'Θουριομάχωντες', we know too little of the precise role of Lampon and Xenokritos

any Athenian chance of dominating the settlement was lost. Ten years later in 434/3 in opposition to Athenian claims Apollo was declared founder of Thourioi.⁷² To judge from Thucydides' admittedly scanty account it gave no assistance to the first Athenian expedition to Sicily from 427 to 424. By 415 it had become the refuge of discontented Athenian expatriates.⁷³ It is true that in 413 after a hard internal political struggle⁷⁴ Thourioi at last gave military support to the Athenians, but very soon after the Athenian defeat in Sicily we find ships from Thourioi fighting *against* Athens.⁷⁵ Thus Athens' first venture in the West was a failure and was seen to be a failure already by the 430s. All that we know of Perikles' policies during the 430s suggests neglect of the West and concentration on Macedonia,⁷⁶ the Thraceward area,⁷⁷ the Hellespont and the Black Sea. Amphipolis was founded by Hagnon⁷⁸ in 436; Perikles led his famous expedition to the Black Sea probably in 435/4;⁷⁹ sometime before the revolt of Poteidaia in 432 Athens had supported the pretender to the Macedonian throne, Philip, against his brother Perdikkas⁸⁰ and was already engaged in a military expedition against Macedonia at the time of Poteidaia's revolt.⁸¹ It is thus probable that Kerkyra's request for alliance in the winter of 434/3 proved something of a sudden embarrassment for both the Athenian assembly and Perikles. We know that the assembly met twice⁸² before deciding to conclude an *epimachia* with Kerkyra and hesitated at first to send more than ten ships in accordance with that alliance. We cannot be sure of what position Perikles himself adopted. He is absent from Thucydides' account of the affair and at least two of the generals in command of the two Athenian squadrons, Lakedaimonios and Drakontides,⁸³ are known opponents of Perikles. Plutarch's story that Perikles supported aid to Kerkyra and chose to give Lakedaimonios only ten ships in order to humiliate him does not convince.⁸⁴ We know that Kerkyra through the efforts of its own *oligoi* had from the start supported the exiled opponents of the Epidamnian *demos*⁸⁵ and we also know that Sparta, presumably afraid of the growing power of Korinth, had earlier attempted unsuccessful diplomatic intervention on the side of Kerkyra against Korinth.⁸⁶ There was a sense, then, in which the Athenian *demos* in supporting Kerkyra was acting

in the foundation of Thourioi; Herodotos may not have been a supporter of Perikles (*cf.* H. Strasburger, *Historia* iv [1955] 1-25) and, in any case, like Lysias (*cf.* K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiaceum* 42) need not have gone to Thourioi until sometime after its initial foundation (see Jacoby, *PW Suppl.* II 224-5, 242, but *cf.* 247); and finally Hippodamos, at least, was clearly no democrat, *cf.* Arist. *Pol.* 1267 b 22 ff.

⁷² D. S. xii 35.1-3.

⁷³ Andok. iv 12. For the date of this pamphlet see below note 124.

⁷⁴ Thuc. vii 33.5-6, 35.1, 57.11.

⁷⁵ Thuc. viii 35.1 in the winter of 412/1.

⁷⁶ The suggestion of *ATL* iii 313 n. 61 that *IG* i² 71 records Athens' first treaty with Perdikkas and is to be dated in the early 430s has little to recommend it. But it is clear from Thuc. i 57.2 that at some date before 432 a treaty of alliance and friendship was concluded between Athens and Perdikkas.

⁷⁷ *Cf.* A. G. Woodhead's proposed dating and interpretation of *IG* i² 45 (=ML 49) in *CQ* NS ii (1952) 57-62. A number of small places in the Thraceward area paid *phoros* for the first time from 435 onwards under special rubrics (*cf.* *ATL* iii 87) and at about the same time the *phoros* of many established payers in the area was increased, see Hill, *Sources for Greek History* (rev. Meiggs and Andrewes),

Table 3 III nos. 6, 9, 11, 12, 17, 20, 37, 42, 44, 46, 60.

⁷⁸ It would seem clear from Plut. *Per.* 32.4 that Hagnon was a supporter of Perikles. For Hagnon's foundation of Amphipolis *cf.* Thuc. iv 102-3; Gomme, *Commentary* ii 164.

⁷⁹ *Cf.* Plut. *Per.* 20.1-2 and for the date Gomme, *Commentary* i 267. Contra, *ATL* iii 114-17.

⁸⁰ Thuc. i 57.3.

⁸¹ Thuc. i 56.6.

⁸² Thuc. i 44.1.

⁸³ For Lakedaimonios and the first squadron of 10 ships see Thuc. i 45.1-2 and for his enmity with Perikles see Plut. *Kim.* 16.1, *Per.* 29.1-2. For Drakontides in *IG* i² 295 + 20-1 and his identity with the Drakontides of Plut. *Per.* 32.3 see ML p. 168.

⁸⁴ Plut. *Per.* 29.1-3 probably from Stesimbrotos, *cf.* Plut. *Kim.* 16.1, and part of the latter's polemic against Perikles. The transference of the responsibility for both squadrons from Lakedaimonios and his friends to Perikles well illustrates Stesimbrotos' cleverness in distorting the truth. *Cf.* Gomme, *Commentary* i 178.

⁸⁵ Thuc. i 24.5, 26.3.

⁸⁶ Thuc. i 28.1 with Gomme, *Commentary* i ad loc. For the extent of Korinthian influence in 435 before the battle of Leukimme see Thuc. i 27.2 and Thuc. i 46.1 for the later position in 433 before the battle of Sybota.

both to the detriment of the Epidamnian *demoi*, i.e. in opposition to its general policy of supporting the many throughout Greece,⁸⁷ and to the advantage of Sparta. In this light the presence of Lakedaimonios as one of the generals in command of the first squadron to Kerkyra takes on an interesting significance. How to react to Kerkyra's request for alliance had clearly been a difficult problem for the Athenians, in that it was in Athenian interests not to allow Kerkyra to fall to the growing naval power of Korinth⁸⁸ and yet to intervene would be to contravene the uneasy division of areas of influence established by the Thirty Years Peace.⁸⁹ What finally tipped the balance in favour of a hesitant *epimachia* with Kerkyra may have been the support that this proposal received from an unexpected quarter, the Iakonists at Athens. It will thus have been one of the ironies of history that the first act in a process of escalation towards a war later conceived by many at Athens as a vehicle for the imposition of empire and democracy on the Greek world should have been partly the responsibility of those at Athens to whom radical Athenian democracy and the further extension of its power were anathema. In so far as Sicily and the position of Kerkyra on the route to Sicily entered into the argument,⁹⁰ it seems probable that what was stressed at the time was Kerkyra's usefulness in preventing food supplies and military aid from reaching the Peloponnese rather than in enabling Athenian offensive action against Sicily.

In late summer 427 the Athenians for the first time sent a fleet to Sicily in the form of twenty ships under the command of Laches.⁹¹ For many in the assembly it was an act prompted by fear and designed to prevent the Syracusans and their Sicilian allies from coming to the aid of the Peloponnesians. For others it represented loyal support for Ionian kinsmen in accordance with alliances concluded more in fear than in any genuine desire to help kinsmen six years before:⁹² Gorgias had no doubt based his appeal to the assembly on alliance and kinship and such arguments must have had some effect.⁹³ Very few thought of the possibility of Athenian conquest of Sicily.⁹⁴ This at any rate is not how Laches, to judge from the way he conducted his campaign,⁹⁵ understood the mood of the assembly that had authorised the expedition. In the winter of 426/5 the Athenians voted that Laches be replaced by Pythodoros immediately and that a reinforcement of forty ships be prepared to sail to Sicily in the spring under Sophokles and Eurymedon. They took this action at the request of their Sicilian allies, who maintained that they were losing ground

⁸⁷ Ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.10.

⁸⁸ Cf. Thuc. i 36.3, 44.2.

⁸⁹ Cf. Thuc. i 35, 36, 40, 43.

⁹⁰ Thucydides i 36.2, 44.3 emphasises the importance of this argument at the time. Against Gomme, *Commentary* i 171 one must insist that such emphasis may owe much to hindsight. As yet Athens had no alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi (see above notes 23 and 31) and it seems clear that the first military intervention in Sicily in 427 was essentially defensive rather than offensive, see below.

⁹¹ Thuc. iii 86.1.

⁹² Thuc. iii 86.4, *καὶ ἐπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος προφάσει βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σίτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι ἀπόθεν κτλ.* For the element of fear involved in the original conclusion of alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi in spring 432 (see above note 31) and still alive in 415 (cf. Thuc. vi 11.2–3, 18.1, 34.8, 36.4, 84.1) it is worth noting Thuc. ii 7.2: it was believed in 431 that the Dorian cities in Italy and Sicily were preparing to send 500 (or possibly 200, see Gomme, *Commentary* ii ad loc.) ships to aid the Peloponnesians.

⁹³ For Gorgias see D. S. xii 53.2–5. The fighting in Sicily, both now (Thuc. iv 61.2–3) and later (Thuc. vi 6.2, 76.2, 77.1, 80.3, 82.2) was clearly represented as a war between Ionian and Dorian. That this was indeed a genuine element in many Athenians' conception of the fighting in Sicily and the reason for Athenian involvement there would seem to be shown by Thucydides' concern to explode the 'myth' at vii 57–8.

⁹⁴ On Thuc. iii 86.4 *πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἶη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχείρια γενέσθαι*, I cannot agree with Gomme's second thoughts (*Commentary* ii 388) that *πρόπειρα* may 'point only to the greater expedition of Eurymedon and Sophokles in 425–4' (cf. Westlake, *Historia* ix (1960) 391) and prefer his more considered opinion (*Commentary* ii 387) 'apparently written after the great campaign of 415–3, as most scholars suppose'. Here, surely, as at iv 60.1 (*ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες*) and 60.2 (*πλέονι ποτε στόλῳ ἐλθόντας*), Thucydides is writing with hindsight.

⁹⁵ Cf. H. D. Westlake, *op. cit.* (note 94) 385 ff.

before the Syracusans.⁹⁶ It is probable that the same allies gave considerable financial support to the Athenian fleet⁹⁷ and Thucydides iii 115.4, ἄμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μελέτην τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ποιέισθαι would seem to suggest that the majority of the Athenians voted for the reinforcement in order to keep the fleet in operation and the sailors employed.⁹⁸ Once established, a fleet had to be maintained and used, i.e. the sailors had to be paid, if it was not to deteriorate rapidly⁹⁹ and by the winter of 426/5 Athens' own financial resources were running out.¹⁰⁰ To send a fleet to Sicily was to put it into cold storage at someone else's expense. By the spring of 424, however, the mood of the Athenians had changed. The Spartan prisoners from Sphakteria were at Athens, the Athenians held Pylos, the Spartans were at Athens' mercy¹⁰¹ and Hyperbolos was talking in the assembly of sending Athenian ships to Carthage, presumably as part of a possible Athenian alliance with Carthage against Syracuse.¹⁰² It was now for the first time in the heady spring of 424 that the Athenians conceived of the possibility of extending their *arche* to Sicily. When their Sicilian allies made peace with the Syracusans at the Conference of Gela and the Athenian generals accepted the allies' decision and returned home they must have been surprised at the reception they received.¹⁰³ No doubt their prosecutors talked of their having received bribes against the best interests of Athens' Sicilian allies and kinsmen, but in fact Thucydides must now be right in insisting that they were condemned for having failed to humble Syracuse and extend the Athenian *arche* into Sicily,¹⁰⁴ something which had been beyond the comprehension of the Athenians who had sent them to Sicily in 425.

From the summer of 424 onwards the possibility of a second Athenian expedition to Sicily, ultimately aimed this time at the conquest of Syracuse and Athenian control of the island, was always present in the minds of the Athenians. It appealed in particular to two groups of Athenians. Of these the first consisted of the sailors and manufacturers in Athens and the Peiraeus who owed their livelihood to the fleet and whose will was made articulate in the assembly by such men as Kleon, Hyperbolos and Archedemos. The second group consisted of young, upper-class intellectuals like Phaiax, Alkibiades and the mysterious author of the pseudo-Xenophontic *Athenaion Politeia*, who despite their loathing of the many and the banausic were fascinated by the stark and ultimate reality of power, the essential ingredients of which in inter-state relationships consisted in their view of ships and money ideally situated in abundance on an island.¹⁰⁵ In theory, at any rate, if the Athenian fleet could be removed from the Peiraeus and the sacred monies of Athene from the Athenian Akropolis to Sicily, then the empire of Athens could be guaranteed for eternity. Furthermore, it was felt that the man who pointed the way to Sicily was assured of that position

⁹⁶ Thuc. iii 115.

⁹⁷ Cf. Westlake, *op. cit.* (note 94) 394 n. 37 quoting Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 925.

⁹⁸ Cf. Westlake, *op. cit.* (note 94) 393-4.

⁹⁹ Perikles realised the importance of μελέτη, Thuc. i 142.6-9. But to get the sailors to practise one had to be able to pay them and later experience (cf. Thuc. viii 83.3) showed how rapidly a fleet—especially one which included many foreign mercenary sailors, cf. Thuc. i 121.3—could disintegrate when the money ran out.

¹⁰⁰ See ML p. 217 for an estimate based on *IG* i² 324+, 306 of Athenian loans from their reserves during the years 433-26: by 426 such loans amounted to almost 5,000 talents.

¹⁰¹ Cf. especially Thuc. iv 55.

¹⁰² It should be noted that in Aristophanes' *Equites* 1300 ff. Hyperbolos is represented as asking for 100 triremes to be sent to Carthage (εις Καρχηδόνα)

rather than against Carthage. Despite Thucydides' description of Alkibiades' intentions at vi 15.2 and the latter's words to the Spartans at vi 90.2 (cf. Hermokrates' mention of Carthaginian fear of an Athenian attack at vi 34.2) all we know of Athenian actions (cf. Thuc. vi 86.6, *SEG* x 136, M. Treu, *Historia* iii [1954] 41 ff., K. F. Stroheker, *Historia* iii [1954] 163 ff.) suggests concern for alliance with Carthage. Cf. now K. J. Dover, *op. cit.* (note 41) 241.

¹⁰³ Thuc. iv 65.2-3.

¹⁰⁴ Thuc. iv 65.3 ὡς ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐν Σικελίᾳ καταστρέψασθαι δόροις πεισθέντες ἀποχωρήσειαν.

¹⁰⁵ I cannot agree with G. W. Bowersock's recent suggestion of c. 442 as the date of ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* (*HSCP* lxxxix [1966] 33-8) and would prefer c. 414 (cf. H. B. Mattingly, *Historia* x [1961] 179). For fresh arguments in favour of the mid-420s see now W. G. Forrest, *Klio* lii (1970) 107-16.

within the imperial city which that same city had in relation to its subject cities, i.e. the position of *tyrannos*.¹⁰⁶ First in the field in this group was Phaiax, a man of some rhetorical ability and strong western connections.¹⁰⁷ In 422 as Athenian ambassador to Sicily and S. Italy, he attempted with limited success to organise a general Sikeliote coalition against Syracuse.¹⁰⁸

Opposed to both these groups were men of moderate and cautious views, to whom Nikias owed much of his support. Since the death of Kleon in 422 and the Peace of 421 Nikias had won for himself a position of considerable authority. His policy of peace with Sparta,¹⁰⁹ the recovery of what had been lost in the Thraceward area¹¹⁰ and the re-establishment of secure financial reserves¹¹¹ was popular with the majority of Athenians in the years immediately following 421. We know well enough what Nikias' attitude was towards sending the expedition to Sicily in 415. Perhaps as early as the mid-420s personal experience of the sufferings of his friend Laches¹¹² following the latter's generalship in Sicily had convinced him that any future involvement in Sicily was to be avoided. As it happened, from 421 to 418 Sicily seems to have been somewhat neglected. Alkibiades at the beginning of his political career preferred to leave Sicily to Phaiax and concentrate instead nearer at home on the Argive alliance. After the failure of this policy at the battle of Mantinea in 418 and the arrival of ambassadors from Egesta in the spring of 417,¹¹³ Alkibiades turned naturally towards Sicily. It was inevitable, given the strength of Nikias and his support, that the Egestaian ambassadors should meet with considerable difficulties. Euphemos' rider in *IG* i² 19+, 15–18, might suggest that they had had trouble in getting an audience.¹¹⁴ They

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Thuc. vi 15.2 on Alkibiades' reasons for wanting the command.

¹⁰⁷ Phaiax, a man of good family (cf. Plut. *Alk.* 13.1) and considerable wealth (cf. Eupolis, *Αἴγες*, fr. 7 [Edmonds] *apud* Athen. iii 106b), was named (?nicknamed, cf. D. S. xi 125.3, *ὁ προσαγορευόμενος Φαίαξ*) after the eponymous ancestor of the Phaiakians, legendary inhabitants of Kerkyra (cf. Thuc. i 25.4, iii 70.4). He was perhaps friendly with Dionysios Chalkous (cf. Bergk fr. 4, *δεξιότης τε λόγου Φαίακος Μουσῶν ἐρέτας ἐπὶ σέλματα πέμπει*), a man closely connected with Thourioi (cf. Photios, s.v. 'Θουριομάντεις') and the West (cf. his son Hieron *apud* Plut. *Nik.* 5). According to Andok. iv 41 by 415 Phaiax had gone on many embassies to Italy and Sicily. He had an earlier namesake at Akragas who built the city's famous aqueducts (D. S. xi 25.3) and he was himself successful there later in 422 (Thuc. v 4.6). His nephew Erasistratos appears in [Plato] *Eryxias* 392b–c in the company of Kritias and strongly urges a large Athenian expedition against Sicily. His son Erasistratos was clearly of anti-democratic sympathies (cf. Plut. *Ages.* 15) and either his son or his nephew Erasistratos was later one of the Thirty (Xen. *Hell.* ii 3.2). For his own political attitude see Andok. iv 8, 16 and for his rhetorical ability see Aristoph. *Eq.* 1375 ff. and Plut. *Alk.* 13.1–3. On the whole family see now J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* 521–4.

¹⁰⁸ Thuc. v 4–5.

¹⁰⁹ Thuc. v 16, 43.2, 46.

¹¹⁰ Thuc. v 83.4, vi 10.

¹¹¹ Thuc. vi 12.1. For Nikias' later concern, almost pathetic preoccupation, with the financial side of the war see Thuc. vi 62, vii 83.2.

The need for caution in the expenditure of public monies was heavily emphasised, almost certainly by Nikias' group, in the period 421–15. The arguments in favour of Beloch's date of 418 for *IG* i² 91 and 92 (*Rh. Mus.* xliii [1888] 113, *Griech. Gesch.* ii 2² 344) seem to need restatement (see now C. W. Fornara, *GRBS* xi [1970] 185–96) against the presently canvassed alternatives of 434/3 and 422/1, see ML 58. Certainly from 418/7 onwards a vote of *ἄδεια* was necessary to enable expenditure (i.e. presumably any above 10,000 dr. cf. *IG* i² 92 = ML 58B 12–19) from the reserves, cf. *IG* i² 302 = ML 77. At Athens in 416–15 heated discussion about the cost of the Sicilian expedition to the public treasury continued right up to the time of the fleet's sailing, cf. ML 78c and now K. J. Dover, *op. cit.* (note 41) 226. The 60 talents brought by the Egestaians (Thuc. vi 8.1) were clearly important. Of particular interest here is Thucydides' own concern with the financial arrangements and cost (vi 31 with O. Regenbogen, *Kleine Schriften* 207–12).

¹¹² For Nikias' friendship with Laches see Plato, *Laches*, *passim*, Thuc. v 43.2, and for attacks upon the latter after his return from Sicily in 426/5 see Appendix p. 146.

¹¹³ Of the three prytanies possible in *IG* i² 19.2—'Ερεχθεῖς, Κεκροπίς and Ἀντιοχίς, two were clearly first and second in 418/7, cf. *IG* i² 302 (=ML 77) 5, 11. But spring 417, historically more probable, is at any rate not excluded by the epigraphical evidence.

¹¹⁴ Cf. in general ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.1 f.

eventually succeeded in gaining their alliance and doubtless asked for immediate Athenian assistance, but none was forthcoming. Nikias opposed it on principle and Phaiax, Alkibiades and Hyperbolos opposed any proposal that gave any one of them more control over the enterprise than the other two. The resultant stalemate could only be resolved by resort to ostracism in the spring of 416.¹¹⁵ In order to avoid his own ostracism and secure that of Phaiax or Hyperbolos, Alkibiades was obliged to make concessions to Nikias,¹¹⁶ which probably resulted in his support for the expedition against Melos in the 416 campaigning season¹¹⁷ and so in further delay for the Eggestaians. However, after his sensational success at the Olympic games of the same year¹¹⁸ his popularity was such that he could drop Nikias, take up the Eggestaian cause and be confident of outdoing Phaiax in securing control of the expedition. It was not too difficult to win over those Athenians who still balked at an open and flagrant act of aggrandisement by the old arguments of the Syracusan threat and aid to kinsmen,¹¹⁹ but even so his opponents did not give up without a fight. Nikias objected to the cost and insisted both that ambassadors be sent to Eggesta to confirm that city's ability to pay for Athenian military aid¹²⁰ and that Athens' other allies in the West likewise pay their share.¹²¹ After he had been elected along with Lamachos at the last minute through no wish of his own to share the command with Alkibiades,¹²² he attempted to have the earlier decree to send the expedition rescinded and finally, in a last desperate attempt to prevent the adventure, he threatened to resign his command unless more ships were sent than had been voted.¹²³ Phaiax showed less scruples in his opposition than Nikias but was no more successful. In the early summer of 415 his friend Andokides circulated a scathing attack on Alkibiades' private and public life in the form of a speech supposedly delivered by Phaiax at the time of the *ostrakophoria* in 416.¹²⁴ Then it was probably thanks to Phaiax' efforts that Alkibiades was not allowed to sail in sole command but was given two colleagues, Lamachos and the unwilling Nikias. Finally, when all else failed, Andokides' *hetaireia* organised the mutilation of the Hermai shortly before the expedition was due to sail.¹²⁵ Even this failed and finally in midsummer 415 an Athenian

¹¹⁵ For this date for the famous last *ostrakophoria* rather than the possible alternatives of 417 (cf. C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 395–6) and 415 (cf. A. E. Raubitschek, *TAPA* lxxix [1948] 191–210) see A. G. Woodhead, *Hesperia* xviii (1949) 78 ff. and M. F. McGregor, *Phoenix* xix (1965) 27 ff.

¹¹⁶ The original version clearly involved Alkibiades, Nikias and Hyperbolos (Plut. *Nik.* 11) with the first two combining against the last. After Theophrastos had rightly insisted on the part played by Phaiax in the whole affair (Plut. *Nik.* 11.7), the further *wrong* inference was made that Alkibiades had combined with Phaiax rather than with Nikias against Hyperbolos (Plut. *Alk.* 13.4–5). On the importance of Phaiax see further E. Vanderpool, *Ostracism at Athens* (Semple Lectures, 1969) 28–9.

¹¹⁷ For Nikias' earlier interest in Melos in 426 see Thuc. iii 91.1–3 and for Alkibiades' association with the 416 expedition see Andok. iv 22.

¹¹⁸ Thuc. vi 16.2, Andok. iv 25–31, Isocr. xvi 34, Plut. *Alk.* 11–12. For the date see K. J. Dover, *op. cit.* (note 41) 246.

¹¹⁹ See above notes 92 and 93.

¹²⁰ Thuc. vi 6.3, 8.2. Thucydides does not say that Nikias was responsible for this, but it is likely, see above note 111.

¹²¹ For later contributions from Naxos, Katane, Rhegion and the Sikels see Meritt, *Hesperia* xxvi

(1957) 198–200. It is clear that hundreds of talents were forthcoming.

¹²² Cf. Thuc. vi 8.4, ML 78.

¹²³ Thuc. vi 14, 20–3.

¹²⁴ Andokides naturally did not feel that his dramatic date of spring 416 required him to ignore subsequent events, e.g. iv 22–3, 25–31. His chosen dramatic context merely gave his pamphlet an acceptable rhetorical form without thereby limiting its content. For differing recent views on Andokides iv see A. E. Raubitschek, *op. cit.* (note 115), A. R. Burn, *CQ* NS iv (1954) 138 ff., K. J. Dover, *op. cit.* (note 41) 287.

¹²⁵ Cf. D. Macdowell, *Andokides On the Mysteries* 190–3. It is interesting that a certain Euphemos, brother of Kallias, son of Telekles—but not himself described as son of Telekles—was closely associated with Andokides (Andok. i 40), was arrested on Diokleides' information (*ibid.* 47) and later released (*ibid.* 66). It is at least possible that this Euphemos was the same man as the Euphemos of *IG* i² 19.15, 96.3, 302.23, D. S. xii 81.1 and Thuc. vi 75.4, 81–8 (see above note 55). Thucydides does not give his Euphemos a patronymic and this may possibly reflect the same embarrassment as in Andokides' description of his Euphemos *twice* as *ὁ Καλλίου τοῦ Τηλεκλέου*ς ἀδελφός (i 40 and 47).

fleet left Athens to fulfil at last treaty obligations contracted with Egesta two years before.

It was Thucydides' final and tendentious view that the Athenians had been interested in securing influence in, and eventually dominating, Sicily since the alliance with Kerkyra in the winter of 434/3.¹²⁶ Subsequent historians, both ancient¹²⁷ and modern, have wished to trace back this interest to *c.* 460. If *IG* i² 19+ is to be dated to 458/7, then they are right. But if the thesis of this paper is correct and *IG* i² 19+ is to be dated, as Mattingly has already suggested,¹²⁸ to 418/7, then we must be much more careful in our analysis of how the Athenians came to involve themselves so tragically in Sicily. Their interest in Sicily in 427 in both its nature and its extent was quite different from the fatal passion of 415. The sickness began first in 425/4. And in their final uncertainty and hesitation on the brink of disaster the Athenians came strangely to resemble Herodotos' great paradigm of an imperial power, Xerxes, King of the Persians.¹²⁹

APPENDIX

The date of the first Athenian alliance with Rhegion (*IG* i² 51 = ML 63) and Leontinoi (*IG* i² 52 = ML 64) has for long been a vexed question. Do the reinscribed prescripts constitute evidence for renewal in 433/2 of alliances made at some earlier date? There is no other known case of renewal in this way¹³⁰ and D. M. Lewis has rightly drawn attention to the oddity of changing the archon, *grammateus*, *epistates* and ambassadors in the reinscribed prescript while leaving unchanged the name of the original proposer.¹³¹

The epigraphical argument must first be dealt with. In the case of *IG* i² 51 there is no significant difference between the letter-forms of the main body of the text and those of the new prescript and one is not justified in placing any interval of time between them (*cf.* the introduction to ML 63, pp. 171–2). There *is* such a difference in *IG* i² 52 (*cf.* the introduction to ML 64, p. 175). The strict implication of this is that the text of *IG* i² 51 plus the prescripts of both *IG* i² 51 and *IG* i² 52 are to be dated to 433/2 with only the text of *IG* i² 52 to be dated earlier.¹³² But this is difficult to believe. Both the original texts probably had the same proposer, Kallias,¹³³ and this would be strange if they were a number of years apart. And it is awkward to have to suppose two different reasons for the reinscription of the prescripts—renewal in *IG* i² 52 and immediate correction of some mistake in *IG* i² 51. One

¹²⁶ Thuc. i 36.2, 44.3, iii 86.4, 115.4 (on the ambivalent *καταλοθήσεσθαι* see Westlake, *op. cit.* [note 94] 392–3), iv 65.3–4, vi 1.1, 6.1. Thucydides clearly thought highly of Hermokrates (*cf.* H. D. Westlake, *BRL* xli [1958/9] 239–68) and Hermokrates supports throughout the *interpretatio maligna* of Athenian intentions (Thuc. iv 59–64, vi 76–80).

¹²⁷ *Cf.* D. S. xii 54.1–3, Plut. *Per.* 20.3.

¹²⁸ *op. cit.* (note 15) 267–70.

¹²⁹ I should like to thank all those concerned with the Institute for Arts and Humanistic Studies at Pennsylvania State University for granting me a Fellowship there in autumn, 1969. Much of the preliminary work on this article was done then. I am grateful, too, for many a helpful discussion about the date of *IG* i² 19+ with Professors M. F. McGregor and H. B. Mattingly, who have both made many fruitful suggestions, saved me from numerous errors and are in no way responsible for any that remain.

¹³⁰ Wade-Gery's suggestion of one possible explanation of Theopompos' remarks on the 'Peace of Kallias' (*Essays in Greek History* 206) naturally extends,

rather than *confirms*, the hypothesis of renewal by reinscription of the prescript.

¹³¹ *JHS* lxxxii (1961) 118 n. 8. Lewis is arguing in particular against *ATL*'s identification (iii 276–7) of the original proposer — —]αζ (*cf.* *IG* i² 51.9) with the prescript's proposer *Καλλίας* (*cf.* *IG* i² 51.8–9, 52.15) and the further guess—dependent, of course, upon the hypothesis of renewal by reinscription—that this Kallias was Kallias, son of Hipponikos, negotiator of the 'Peace of Kallias'. But *prima facie* there *is* a good case for the identity of the original proposer with the prescript's proposer and this combination of—on the hypothesis of renewal—the new with the old is odd. But perhaps it would on the same hypothesis have been even odder if the original proposer had been replaced by the new proposer of the renewal. Surely the hypothesis of renewal by reinscription of the prescripts is altogether odd.

¹³² *Cf.* S. Accame, *Riv. Fil.* lxxx (1952) 129–32.

¹³³ *Cf.* above note 131.

must, I think, presume—despite the difference in letter-forms—that the original texts of both *IG* i² 51 and 52 were inscribed at the same time. This leaves two alternatives: either (A) one ignores the similarity in letter-forms between text and prescript in *IG* i² 51 and dates the original texts of both to the 440s with renewal by reinscription of the prescripts in 433/2,¹³⁴ or (B) one ignores the difference in letter-forms between text and prescript in *IG* i² 52 and dates the original texts of both to 433/2 with immediate, or almost immediate,¹³⁵ reinscription of the prescripts to correct some irrecoverable mistake. On purely epigraphical grounds alternative A is preferable: the letter-forms of the text of *IG* i² 52, especially the single V upsilon and some of the mus and nus, have a distinctly early appearance. But the absence of a precedent for renewal by reinscription of prescript, the oddity of the whole procedure and indeed the very idea of renewal of ‘eternal’ alliances weigh heavily against the purely epigraphical argument. On balance it would seem more sensible to choose alternative B, to which such objections do not apply, and suppose that the text of *IG* i² 52 was cut in 433/2 by an old-fashioned, rather slipshod mason. The single preserved V upsilon is in fact squeezed in awkwardly between the adjacent letters¹³⁶ and there is no consistency in the mus and nus. It is not incumbent upon the believer in alternative B to identify the mistake which required immediate, or almost immediate, reinscription of the prescripts. There are countless possibilities and too many unknown factors involved.

It has been thought that alternative B cannot be maintained against Thuc. iii 86.3 describing the Athenian decision in 427 to send out the first expedition to Sicily: *ἐς οὖν τὰς Ἀθήνας πέμψαντες οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ὅτι Ἴωνες ἦσαν πείθουσι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμψαι σφίσι ναῦς*. Most scholars believe that *κατὰ τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν* refers back to *IG* i² 51 and 52.¹³⁷ Supporters of alternative A¹³⁸ are tempted to argue that the use of *παλαιός* necessitates an interval of more than 5–6 years between the original alliances, i.e. the texts of *IG* i² 51 and 52, and the appeal of iii 86.3. Supporters of alternative B¹³⁹ quote instances of *παλαιός* in Thucydides covering only a few years. What is required is a thorough treatment of *παλαιός* in Thucydides. One can begin by distinguishing a descriptive from an evaluative use (*cf.* *πάλαι* used descriptively at e.g. i 2.1 [= *olim cf.* Bétant, *Lexicon Thucydideum*, s.v. ‘πάλαι’] and evaluatively at e.g. iii 13.1 [= *iampridem cf.* Bétant, *ibid.* s.v. ‘πάλαι’ (b)]) and two subdivisions of the descriptive *παλαιός*, *viz.* ‘ancient’ (*cf.* with the article i 3.1, 5.3, 6.6, 7, 10.2, 10.4, 13.5, 15.1, 20.1, 24.2, 49.1, 73.2, 101.2, ii 15.6, 22.3 [56.2], iii 55.1, 68.1, v 30.4, 43.2, 69.1 [vii 25.5], viii 3.1, 71.1; and without the article i 21.1, iii 67.2, iv 31.2, v. 1, 42, vii 33.4, [53.4]), and ‘the old, i.e. previous’ with contextually explicit or implicit comparison between the referent and something new (*cf.* i 29.3, iv 79.2, v 2.4, 3.2, 80.2, viii 90.4). In the meaning ‘ancient’ the article may or

¹³⁴ *Cf.* B. D. Meritt, *CQ* xl (1946) 85–91.

¹³⁵ *Cf.* Accame, *op. cit.* (note 23) 73–5. H. B. Mattingly, *op. cit.* (note 15) 272 dates the reinscription of the prescripts sometime in the 420s ‘presumably to give greater chronological precision by adding the name of the archon and the first secretary of the council’, *cf.* ML p. 174. The large measure of uncertainty makes any probability in establishing the ‘mistake’ impossible.

¹³⁶ *Cf.* Meritt, *op. cit.* (note 34) 89, who notes further concerning the carelessness of the mason, ‘The two accusatives Ἀθηναίος (line 17) and Λεοντίνος (line 18) were changed to datives by the adding of iotas outside their stoichoi. This too was in correction of an error. It seems obvious that the stonemason, when he made the mistakes, was under the impression that he was writing the sentence *χουμμάχος εἶναι Ἀθηναίος καὶ Λεοντίνος καὶ τὸν ὄρκον*

δῶναι καὶ δέχσασθαι. On remembering that the sentence had been begun *τέμ μὲν χουμμάχίαν εἶναι*, though not too successfully begun even so, he had to change Ἀθηναίος to Ἀθηναίους and Λεοντίνος to Λεοντίνους.’

¹³⁷ But *cf.* Accame, *op. cit.* (notes 132 and 135) for the view that *παλαιὰ ξυμμαχία* refers back beyond *IG* i² 51 and 52 to earlier Athenian alliance *c.* 460, at least with Rhegion.

¹³⁸ But *cf.* ML p. 174. One suspects that supporters of alternative A are loath to base any central argument upon *παλαιός* against supporters of alternative B because they realise that such an argument supports Accame’s hypothesis (*op. cit.* [notes 132 and 135] with references to Thuc. ii 22.3 and v 69.1) more than their own.

¹³⁹ *Cf.* Mattingly, *op. cit.* (note 15) 272 n. 73 quoting Thuc. iii 13.1 (*πάλαι*), iv 79.2.

may not be present, but in the meaning 'the old, i.e. previous' the article is *always* present. Thus, if Thucydides is using *παλαιός* descriptively in *κατά τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν*, then he must mean 'in accordance with ancient alliance' and his words cannot be understood as a reference to an alliance of *either* 433/2 (alternative B) *or* the 440s (alternative A) *or even c.* 460 (Accame, *cf.* notes 132 and 135 above). He refers rather to some ancient alliance, probably, as the following words (*καὶ ὅτι Ἴωνες ἦσαν*) suggest, to traditional alliance between all Ionians. It is extremely unlikely that he was ignorant of *IG* i² 51 and 52, *cf.* Hermokrates' words at iv 60.1 (*ὀνόματι ἐννόμῳ ξυμμαχίας*), 61.4 (*τὸ δίκαιον μᾶλλον τῆς ξυνθήκης*) and especially 63.1 (*καὶ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐς ἀίδιον ξυμβῶμεν*, *cf.* *IG* i² 51.12, 15; 52.22, 26) and the later, chronologically vague reference at vi 6.2. The brevity of his treatment of the first Sicilian expedition has often been noticed (*cf.* Westlake, *op. cit.* [note 94] 385 ff.). He seems to have been critical of the whole undertaking by οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἀθηναῖοι (*cf.* iv 65.3 and compare his defence of Laches at iii 103.3, 115.6 with Kleon's attacks, Aristoph. *Vesp.* 240–2 and 836 ff. with the scholiast on 240 and 895). It is probable, then, that in preferring to ignore at iii 86.3 the known fact of *IG* i² 51 and 52 and mentioning instead the rhetoric of the situation¹⁴⁰ Thucydides shows his *Tendenz*. He first refers obliquely to the formal alliance in Hermokrates' speech, where he can use it in denigration of Athenian presence in Sicily. In his tendentious zeal he has given himself away. Such are the necessary implications of believing in a descriptive use of *παλαιός* at iii 86.3. They can be avoided only by supposing an evaluative use of *παλαιός* similar to the use of *παλαιά* at iii 13.1, vi 10.5. The *ξυμμαχία* will then be a reference to *IG* i² 51 and 52 and *παλαιά* mean simply 'not concluded now and so irrelevant to the present situation'. But Thucydides' *Tendenz* is still apparent, even if more honestly expressed. The close parallels between iii 86 and vi 6 are interesting. One finds the same chronological uncertainty in the background information (iii 86.2–3, οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι . . . καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης = vi 6.2 ὄμοροι γὰρ ὄντες . . . ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἰκανά), the same initial neglect of the known fact of formal alliance, the same first reference to pre-existent formal alliance in a later context of denigration (compare iv 60.1 with vi 10.5), in short the same *Tendenz*.

A final point in favour of alternative B. The first Sicilian expedition is the story of Athens and Rhegion fighting against Rhegion's closest enemies, Messana and Lokroi (*cf.* iii 86.5, 90.2–4, 99, 103.3, 115.2, 6, iv 24–25.6). Leontinoi enters in barely at the beginning (iii 86. 3 οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι, *not* οἱ Λεοντῖνοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, and there must be a difference despite Gomme, *Commentary* ii ad loc.) and ineffectively at the end (iv 25.7–12). This concern in 427–5 to support Rhegion and control the approaches from the West rather than join Leontinoi in war against Syracuse is typical of Athens' defensive attitude towards the West since 433 (see above p. 140 with note 92). The fact that the same attitude is reflected in the respective oaths of *IG* i² 51. 10–16 (long, insistent and specific) and *IG* i² 52.20–3 (short and perfunctory)¹⁴¹ confirms that these alliances were in fact first made in 433/2.

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¹⁴⁰ I presume that Gorgias in 427 (*cf.* D. S. xiii 53.2–5) dwelt upon the kinship of all Ionians and their traditional alliance against Dorians (see above note 93) as well as, of course, appealing to the alliance of 433/2.

¹⁴¹ I am grateful to Professor Mattingly for drawing my attention to this difference between the two oaths. It is surely significant, as Accame (*op. cit.* [note 132] 129) realised, and it is perhaps not

fanciful to regard the short oath in *IG* i² 52 as evidence of Athenian disinterest in alliance with Leontinoi. Perhaps even Leontinoi, and not Athens, paid for the inscription of *IG* i² 52 (*cf.* D. M. Lewis, *op. cit.* [note 61] 23) whereas Athens, and not Rhegion, paid for the inscription of *IG* i² 51. This would help to explain why two different masons, one good (*IG* i² 51) and one bad (*IG* i² 52), were employed to inscribe the original texts of the two inscriptions.